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Highlights
- At the 18th Madrid Forum (2010) the discussion of an EU gas 
target model was officially launched. It aims at defining a non-
binding vision giving coherence to the coming set of European 
gas framework guidelinesand grid codes.
- There is a European-wide consensus to ensure third party access 
to interconnections and to promote EU gas trade across the en-
tire EU as to reach – let’s say 2014 - a target model of “achieve-
ment of the internal market’.
- J.M Glachant (director of FSR) and S. Ascari (FSR gas adviser) 
agree that interconnection capacity is key to increasing trade 
among EU countries. However, they do not have the same view 
on who should decide on and who should pay for the needed in-
vestment, and how trading places should be selected.
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Background
The 3rd package did not describe a “target model” – which says 
a lot on the absence of common vision of the matter among 
European countries. It did, however, ask for the creation of 
EU-wide network code(s) to facilitate cross border gas trans-
actions. All the transmission system operators (TSOs) will 
then have to obey the single network code(s) when operating 
the transmission networks. To keep these network codes in 
line with European regulation aims, a set of binding or non-
binding framework guidelines are developed by ACER and the 
European Commission. 
In this context, with the aim to give global coherence to these 
guidelines and code(s), the European regulators launched a 
consultation process in July 2011 to define a gas market target 
model. It is a non-binding vision providing a unified frame on 
the future layout of gas market architecture. 
On the one hand, a target model should say how the avail-
able transmission capacity can be allocated (from the long to 
the short term), and how it could be expanded through new 
investments. On the other hand, the target model also has to 
define key characteristics of the gas trade, and indicate an in-
stitutional frame that fits with such characteristics. During the 
first semester of 2011, the FSR director and gas advisor posed 
for discussion two top-down target models: MECOS and 
EURAM. They are a European (MECOS) and an American 
(EURAM) models for Europe gas market architecture.
Summary of the proposed MECOS and EURAM target 
models
MECOS is a “Market Enabling, COnnecting and Securing” 
model describing the final state that the EU gas market should 
achieve over time (2015?, 2020?). The main aim is to guarantee 
to every European final customer easy access to a wholesale 
gas market respecting a minimum set of rules, notably those 
“enabling” and “connecting” markets (the EU consumer is 
guaranteed both a certain access and a certain set of market 
rules). EURAM (EURopean American Model) distinguishes 
from MECOS in underlining the importance of including the 
market supply forces at the core of the model definition, espe-
cially in the definition of the transport investment and market 
arrangements. Building on these contrasting approaches, these 
two target models propose different solutions to transport net-
work development and allocation, as well as to the promotion 
of gas hubs.
Box 1 - MECOS model main pillars
• The network access should enable functioning, liquid and competitive wholesale gas markets. The guarantee will 
come from a regulated capacity access defined through EU code(s). The corresponding investment will involve a 
regulatory oversight at Member State and EU levels plus an indicative planning at the EU level. 
• The model promotes short and mid-term price alignment by facilitating cross-market borders trading. It will also 
ease trade by implementing market coupling and by expanding the coupling of market areas. It assumes an in-
crease of interconnection of the grids and a unification of the operation of market and network (entry/exit pricing; 
congestion management; balancing).
• MECOS establishes a secure supply pattern by favouring open seasons backed with transport long term contracts. 
These long term contracts, however, should not foreclose shorter term trade nor impede regulators from interven-
ing in the initial capacity definition or the following contracting arrangement. Then “approved” network expansion 
not being implemented by the locally existing TSOs can be auctioned off to all other interested investors (the grid 
investment monopoly is made contestable at the margin).
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Box 2 - EURAM model main propositions
• EURAM does not challenge all MECOS proposals. It mainly aims at correcting MECOS where it deviates too much 
from the proper dynamics of market supply forces.
• The gas transport network is not necessarily a natural monopoly, and thus its regulation frame need to take into 
account its competitive potential and favour it. The competitive potential in transportation is a key source of ef-
ficiency improvement which should be accounted for and promoted. Actually, if market forces push gas transport 
investment as in the U.S, congestion constrains requiring auctions and other managements should be very rare.
• Network tariff regulation should be streamlined across Europe and designed in a way to properly address issues 
arising from cross border trade, including the transfer of capacity rights to (and payment by) downstream market 
players including possibly TSOs.
• It is not just network investment which should take market forces into account, but the proper development of 
hubs. Regulators cannot build or design market places by themselves. They can only enable a dynamic market 
play or not. The risk of too many hubs would be liquidity fragmentation, and hence the delay of real market inte-
gration.
The two target models, while sharing some common views, 
propose different solutions especially with regard to transport 
investment. MECOS seeks a regulated development of the net-
work targeted at facilitating EU gas trade and a plan of market 
areas expansion. This would be done by an ex-ante definition 
of the efficient network and the well-functioning market places. 
EURAM relies on freeing market forces to permit them to de-
fine the development of an efficient network according to their 
market strategies. Public interest can be added to market forces 
here or there, but it cannot replace them as the engine of grid 
expansion and market place (hubs) building. Trade will occur 
where there is trade and traders. Trading arrangements should 
follow traders’ needs.
The role of gas transport networks
TSOs cannot create markets just by themselves, but they are a 
central part of the industry chain where gas markets operate.
1. Existent Capacity
Both MECOS and EURAM models agree on using an entry/exit 
frame to allocate transport capacity. In Europe, the entry/exit 
scheme is widely seen as a pre-condition to create functioning 
markets.
However the degree of centralization in the capacity allocation 
differs in the two models. MECOS proposes centralized auc-
tions of standardized transport products via virtual hubs, and 
does not conceive any other place to trade. The various virtual 
hubs could be unified by fully merging their corresponding 
markets. One can also create a single hub on the top of the exist-
ing end users’ balancing zones through the creation of “trading 
regions” (with separated balancing areas). MECOS also strongly 
supports implicit auctions as the mechanism to allocate capacity 
in the shorter term (at least Day Ahead) and recommend expe-
riencing it through pilots.
EURAM, on its side, still values explicit mechanisms to allocate 
capacity. The capacity market could be reinforced by the use of 
an open subscription process, which is close to a kind of co-
ordinated EU-wide open season. This would be based on a com-
mon trading platform covering all the EU capacity market. In 
the case of congested lines, EURAM suggests using shorter-term 
auctions. EURAM does not see the necessity of trading in any 
virtual points, as trading is likely to concentrate in few markets. 
4Policy Brief 2011/08
Florence School of Regulation
However market coupling may remain a valid option for short 
term trade involving congested cross-hub capacity. 
2.    New Capacity
One of the main consequences of including the active role of 
markets in network development can be noted in the divergent 
proposals of EURAM and MECOS models. 
The MECOS model addresses the investment in inter-connec-
tion and intra-connection mainly under a regulated environ-
ment. The inter-connection should include long-term con-
tracts as well. Thus, MECOS proposes an open season process 
to deal with the inherent uncertainties on investing in new 
interconnections. This open season process would have to be 
performed periodically for all existing interconnection capac-
ity and on demand. 
According to the MECOS model, the decision to build a new 
interconnection infrastructure should be based on:
•	 The contract signed through the open season process 
where the shippers are able to sign ‘long term contracts’
•	
•	 The capacity expected be contracted in the future through 
short and mid-term mechanisms.
And the revenue to pay for this capacity should also come 
from these two kinds of capacity:
•	 The long term contracts should pay part of the capacity 
cost.
•	 The other part of the cost should be paid by the TSO’s net-
work tariffs.
Therefore, the TSOs may accept to bear a share of the utiliza-
tion risk associated with constructing capacity for a short- and 
mid-term market in exchange for a higher rate of return on 
that part of investment. 
Moreover, according to MECOS, the intra-connection pipe-
lines investment risk should be borne by the regulated tariffs. 
Thus, inside national/regional market the TSO and the author-
ity responsible for including the asset in the regulated revenue 
are actually the main players deciding investment localisation 
and amounts.
Box 3 - Inter-connection and intra-connection pipelines
• The interconnection pipelines are the ones which help to connect separated markets better and thereby improve 
the price alignment among different markets. The access of these pipelines is the key to allowing the interconnec-
tion between the different European markets.
• The intra-connection pipelines are the infrastructure which fulfils its task within a market (i.e. within an entry/exit 
area) and often under control of national or sub-national TSOs. Increasing the intra-connection capacity can either 
serve increased demand in a market or can help to ‘debottleneck’ an entry/exit area, which means decreasing the 
‘balance’ costs associated to entry/exit model.      
The EURAM model diverges in underlining the importance 
of market forces in investment decisions. The open subscrip-
tion process would be the tool to allocate existent capacity on 
a long term basis, and also to give information to market play-
ers regarding the demand to build new capacity. This model 
does not exclude the possibility to have public intervention, 
as all stakeholders (public and private) should be able to bid 
in the open subscription process. The investment in intercon-
nections should be mainly decided and paid for by long term 
contracts. EURAM agrees with MECOS in advocating that 
some capacity should be kept to be allocated in the middle and 
short term. 
In summary, the EURAM model supports that third party ac-
cess should be guaranteed mainly by allowing all players to 
contract under harmonized conditions, instead of increasing 
the use of implicit auctions. 
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Hub Development
The two proposed target models aim to promote the connec-
tion between markets increasing the liquidity of the European 
cross-border trade. The tools proposed, however, differ.
MECOS aims to allow all EU end-users to allocate gas at any 
point of the network. Thus:
•	 All end-users should be inserted in a market (either na-
tional or regional).
•	 The cross-border trade should be promoted by virtual 
trading points to allow changes of ownership and ac-
counting of gas flows by merging markets or by region 
trades.
EURAM implies a different view regarding the development 
of European hubs:
•	 Hub development is seen as a result of market forces in-
centives. Furthermore, they will present different sizes 
and relative importance, depending on the interest of 
players to trade in them.
•	 It highlights the recommendation that the regulatory role 
developing hubs should focus just on the harmonization 
of rules, instead of developing inefficient hubs.
In that environment, and observing the evolution of the US 
gas market, the EURAM proposal foresees that the number of 
hubs will probably be significantly smaller than the number of 
national markets.
Comparing the proposals
The main differences between the two models are related to 
the reliance on the potential advantages of introducing com-
petition in gas transport networks. 
The MECOS proposal follows the approach of adapting the 
spirit of the power networks regulation to the regulation of gas 
networks. Loosely, present European power network regula-
tion seeks promoting efficient markets by the use of implicit 
auctions to ensure the adequate use of infrastructures, and by 
the centralized planning of the network. 
On the other hand, EURAM observes that several physical 
features of gas industry are not so close to the power sector, 
which makes the gas network subject to potential liberaliza-
tion to enhance its efficiency. This can be thought of as one of 
the main motivations for the EURAM proposal, which seeks 
to introduce more competition in the gas transportation ac-
tivity, especially focusing on network investment decision, 
paralleling in some ways the US scheme. However, EURAM 
keeps the main ideas of EU network code(s) as proposed by 
the Third Package. It keeps the regulation of capacity use still 
close to MECOS proposition based on entry/exit model and 
national tariffs, rather than the bilateral contract model mainly 
applied in the interstate USA frame.
The two proposed models have many similarities, as they do 
not disagree in the main aspects defined by the European 3rd 
package. However, they fundamentally disagree on the role 
that markets (or long term contracts) should play regarding 
the use of gas transport networks, the development of market 
hubs and, regarding decisions on network investments (even 
when public intervention is accepted in the two models). 
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